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INTRODUCTION
Can a compensation consultant provide objective advice to the
board regarding executives’ pay packages when the same consultant
provides other services to the company? Can investors understand how
executives are compensated if companies do not disclose the level of
performance that the company must achieve for executives to obtain
certain amounts of compensation? Is the disclosure about executive
compensation complete, absent full information regarding earnings on
deferred compensation and perquisites? 1 This Article concludes that the
answer to these three questions is a resounding no. 2 Although the
Securities and Exchange Commission (“SEC”) promulgated new
executive compensation disclosure rules that governed the 2007 proxy
season, 3 the foregoing issues were not adequately addressed by the new
rules.
For example, when the board of the North Fork Bancorporation
(“North Fork”) hired Mercer Human Resources Consulting for
compensation advice, Mercer suggested a golden parachute that would
pay the top three executives $288 million if the company underwent a
change in control. 4 This package included a tax gross-up on restricted
stock to the chief executive officer (“CEO”) of $44 million. 5 One pay
1.
2.
3.

See infra Part IV.
See infra Part V.
Executive Compensation and Related Person Disclosure, Securities Act
Release No. 8732A, Exchange Act Release No. 54302A, Investment Company Act
Release No. 27444A, 71 Fed. Reg. 53,158 (Sept. 8, 2006) available at
http://www.sec.gov/rules/final/2006/33-8732afr.pdf [hereinafter Adopting Release].
4. Jesse Drucker & James Bandler, North Fork Executives to Receive $288
Million for Capital One Deal, WALL ST. J., Mar. 14, 2006, at A1. “[A] golden
parachute [is a] lucrative contract given to a top executive to provide lavish benefits in
case the company is taken over by another firm, resulting in the loss of the job. A
golden parachute might include generous severance pay, stock options, or a bonus.”
JOHN DOWNES & JORDAN ELLIOT GOODMAN, DICTIONARY OF FINANCE AND
INVESTMENT TERMS (7th ed. 2006).
5. See Gretchen Morgenson, Bank Deal’s Payout Plan Questioned, N.Y. TIMES,
Mar. 15, 2006, at C1. A tax gross-up is an executive compensation tool that enables a
company to cover the taxes on an executive’s perks and benefits. Drucker & Bandler,
supra note 4. In other words, “a tax buy-off is known as a ‘gross-up’ because
beneficiaries receive ‘gross’ pretax sums rather than net post-tax sums.” Daniel Gross,
Gross-Up? Gross Out. The Latest Abomination in CEO Pay, SLATE, Mar. 15, 2006,
http://www.slate.com/id/2138119/?nav=tap3. Restricted stock may be defined as
follows: “Insider holdings that are under some other kind of sales restriction. Restricted
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expert concluded that the CEO could potentially receive tax gross-up
payments worth nearly $111 million. 6 Essentially, the corporation
would pay the taxes for a CEO taking home about $185 million. 7 This
pay package raises a red flag: it is unusual for a company to pay the
taxes on restricted stock upon a change in control. 8 However, Mercer
recommended this uncommon compensation package in a situation
where it performed other services for the bank. 9 In fact, Mercer earned
nearly $1 million in 2002 and 2003 for its services as actuary to North
Fork’s cash-balance retirement plan. 10
North Fork’s payment to Mercer for these services certainly raises
doubts as to whether Mercer provided objective advice to the board and
highlights an area of disclosure that the new rules fail to address. In
fact, this compensation package exemplifies the reality of the new rules.
While the amendments are an overall improvement to the previous
regime, they do not result in complete disclosure.
Part I of this Article describes the history of executive
compensation and the disclosure of this compensation. Part II discusses
problems with incomplete disclosure. Part III discusses the amendments
to the executive compensation disclosure rules. Part IV discusses the
four areas in which the rules fall short: a lack of information regarding
compensation consultants, a lack of disclosure of target performance
levels, a lack of disclosure of earnings on deferred compensation, and a
lack of disclosure of perquisites. Part V proposes solutions for more
effective executive compensation disclosure. Part VI concludes this
Article.

stock must be traded in compliance with special SEC regulations. Insiders are given
restricted stock after merger and acquisition activity . . . .” Definition of Restricted
Stock, http://www.investopedia.com/terms/r/restrictedstock.asp (last visited Sept. 9,
2007).
6. See Drucker & Bandler, supra note 4.
7. Id.
8. See Morgenson, supra note 5.
9. Id.
10. Id.
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I. BACKGROUND
A. History Of Executive Compensation
Executive compensation is a relatively new area of study.11 In fact,
such compensation did not exist prior to the development of the modern
corporation. 12 This form of business organization started with New
Jersey legislation in 1896, and by 1901 the first major corporation was
organized. 13 When corporations first formed and developed, they were
led by entrepreneurs, exemplified by men like Henry Ford. 14 By the
middle of the twentieth century, however, a new class of business actor
evolved to run corporate America. 15 These individuals did not found
companies, but rather made up an elite class of executives who held
powerful positions in major corporations. 16
Even though a corporation must disclose the pay for its top five
executives, 17 the study of executive compensation typically focuses on
the pay received by the CEO. 18 The CEO typically receives the highest
pay of any person in the corporation, and this amount of compensation
has increased over time. 19 By the 1950s, some CEOs were making
relatively large salaries, but many salaries were not exorbitant. 20 As of
1960, the average CEO at a large corporation earned around $190,000, 21
equivalent to approximately $1.3 million today. 22 CEO pay rose quickly
11. James A. Cotton, Toward Fairness in Compensation of Management and
Labor: Compensation Ratios, A Proposal for Disclosure, 18 N. ILL. U. L. REV. 157,
158-62 (1997).
12. Id.
13. Carl T. Bogus, Excessive Executive Compensation and the Failure of
Corporate Democracy, 41 BUFF. L. REV. 1, 8 (1993).
14. Id. at 9.
15. Id.
16. Id.
17. 17 C.F.R. § 229.402(3) (2007).
18. See generally LUCIAN ARYE BEBCHUK & JESSE M. FRIED, PAY WITHOUT
PERFORMANCE: THE UNFULFILLED PROMISE OF EXECUTIVE COMPENSATION (2004)
(addressing the topic of executive compensation by solely analyzing the pay of CEOs).
19. Id. at 1.
20. See Bogus, supra note 13, at 10.
21. Id.
22. See U.S. DEP’T OF LABOR, BUREAU OF LABOR STATISTICS, INFLATION
CALCULATOR, http://data.bls.gov/cgi-bin/cpicalc.pl (last visited Sept. 9, 2007) (follow
“About this calculator” hyperlink).
The CPI inflation calculator uses the average Consumer Price Index for a given
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during the 1960s and then slowed during the 1970s. 23 Between 1980
and 1993, executive compensation increased dramatically. 24
From 1993 to 2000, the amount of executive compensation
increased sharply. 25 In large companies, such as those representing the
S&P 500, average CEO pay increased from $3.7 million in 1993 to
$17.4 million in 2000. 26 Unsurprisingly, the aggregate pay of the top
five executives increased from $9.5 million to $36.6 million in this time
period. 27 There were similar trends in both the mid-cap and small-cap
firms for both CEO pay and the pay of the top five executives. 28
Executive compensation peaked in 2000 and decreased during 2001, due
mainly to the poor performance of the stock market. 29 Executive
compensation levels, however, have been on the rise since 2001. 30 In
fact, CEO pay increased 6% in 2006. 31

calendar year. This data represents changes in prices of all goods and services
purchased for consumption by urban households. This index value has been
calculated every year since 1913. For the current year, the latest monthly index value
is used.

Id.
23.
24.

See Bogus, supra note 13, at 10.
Id. For example, during the 1980s CEO compensation rose by 212% in real
terms. Id.
25. Lucian Arye Bebchuk & Yaniv Grinstein, The Growth of Executive Pay 2 (The
Harv. John M. Olin Discussion Paper Series, Paper No. 510, 2005), available at http://
www.law.harvard.edu/programs/olin_center/papers/pdf/Bebchuk_et%20al_510.pdf
(relying on compensation information from the standard ExecuComp database, which
“includes all the S&P 500, Mid-Cap 400 and Small-Cap 600 companies). “Together,
these firms constitute more than 80% of the total market capitalization of U.S. public
firms.” Id. “Mid cap stocks typically have between $1 billion and $5 billion in
outstanding market value” while “[s]mall cap stocks usually have a market
capitalization of $500 million or less.” Downes & Goodman, supra note 4, at 421, 655.
26. Bebchuk & Grinstrein, supra note 25, at 3. This jump in pay represents an
increase of 370% in real terms.
27. Id. This jump in pay represents an increase of 285% in real terms.
28. See id.
29. Boss’s Pay: The WSJ / Mercer 2002 CEO Compensation Survey, WALL ST. J.,
Apr. 14, 2003, at R6.
30. See id; see also CEO Compensation Survey (A Special Report) – The Boss’s
Pay: The WSJ / Mercer 2005 CEO Compensation Survey, WALL ST. J., Apr. 10, 2006,
at R7.
31. Press Release, Equilar Inc., Equilar Study Finds S&P 500 CEO Pay Up 6.0
Percent to $8.5 Million (Apr. 12, 2007), available at http://www.equilar.com/newslet
ter/april_2007/2007_04_ect_pv.html (last visited Sept. 9, 2007).
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B. History of Executive Compensation Disclosure
Before there were specific disclosure rules for executive
compensation, requirements for disclosure were in Schedule A to the
Securities Act of 1933 (“Securities Act”) and Section 12(b) of the
Securities Exchange Act of 1934 (“Exchange Act”). 32 Both acts list the
types of information that must be disclosed in registration statements. 33
After observing that executive compensation needed more specific
attention, the SEC enacted its first executive compensation disclosure
rules for proxy statements in 1938. 34 Since then, the Commission’s
rules require companies to provide a narrative explanation of the levels
of compensation, provide these levels of compensation in tabular form,
or provide both types of disclosure. 35 For example, the Commission
introduced the first tabular disclosure of executive compensation in
1942. 36 Ten years later, it introduced a separate table for pensions and
deferred compensation, and in 1978, the SEC expanded tabular
disclosure to cover all forms of executive pay. 37 Owing to the fact that
the 1978 rules were overly complex, too detailed, and resulted in too
many interpretive issues, the SEC issued new rules in 1983. 38 While the

32. Adopting Release, supra note 3, at 53,160 n.44.
33. Id.
Item 14 of Schedule A called for disclosure of the “remuneration, paid or estimated to
be paid, by the issuer or its predecessor, directly or indirectly, during the past year and
ensuing year to (a) the directors or persons performing similar functions, and (b) its
officers and other persons, naming them wherever such remuneration exceeded
$25,000 during any such year.” Section 12(b) of the Exchange Act as enacted
required disclosure of “(D) the directors, officers, and underwriters, and each security
holder of record holding more than 10 per centum of any class of any equity security
of the issuer (other than an exempted security), their remuneration and their interests
in the securities of, and their material contracts with, the issuer and any person
directly or indirectly controlling or controlled by, or under direct or indirect common
control with, the issuer;” and “(E) remuneration to others than directors and officers
exceeding $20,000 per annum.”

Id.
34.
35.
36.
37.
38.

Id. at 53,160 n.45.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Disclosure of Executive Compensation, Securities Act Release No. 6486,
Exchange Act Release No. 20,220, Investment Company Act Release No. 13,529, 48
Fed. Reg. 44,467 (Sept. 29, 1983) [hereinafter 1983 Release].
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1983 rules mandated some tabular disclosure, they primarily required
narrative disclosure. 39
After analyzing the effectiveness of limited tabular disclosure, the
Commission adopted amendments to the executive compensation rules
in 1992. 40 These amendments abandoned the primarily narrative
disclosure approach for a highly formatted tabular one to facilitate the
comparison of annual compensation among companies. 41 Because of
the complexity of compensation programs, however, the Commission
observed that the rigidity of the 1992 rules did not result in complete
disclosure. 42
In August 2006, after determining that the 1992 rules required
significant changes, the SEC amended the executive compensation
disclosure rules. 43 The new rules build on the 1992 amendments by
providing broader tabular disclosure while simultaneously improving
narrative disclosure. 44
Consequently, the amended rules most
comprehensively govern executive compensation relative to previous
regimes. 45 Yet despite their improvement, the new rules do not result in
complete disclosure. 46
II. PROBLEMS WITH INCOMPLETE DISCLOSURE
There are two main problems with incomplete disclosure of
executive compensation.
First, shareholders cannot adequately
influence the board of directors’ decisions regarding executive pay
without complete disclosure of such compensation. 47 Second, when
shareholders, business media, social groups and professional groups do
39. Adopting Release, supra note 3, at 53,160; see generally 1983 Release, supra
note 38.
40. Adopting Release, supra note 3, at 53,161.
41. Id.
42. Id.
43. Id. at 53,160.
44. See id. (explaining that “[t]his approach will promote clarity and completeness
of numerical information through an improved tabular presentation, continue to provide
the ability to make comparisons using tables, and call for material qualitative
information regarding the manner and context in which compensation is awarded and
earned”).
45. Id.
46. See infra Part IV.
47. See BEBCHUK & FRIED, supra note 18, at 51-52 (arguing that shareholders’
resolutions can influence executive pay practices).
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not know the full measure of compensation paid to executives, there is a
risk that executives and board members will be affected by so-called
“outrage costs.” 48
A. Inability of Shareholders to Influence Board
Complete disclosure of the entire amount of executive
compensation informs both institutional and private shareholders about
the actual levels of executive pay. 49 When this information is properly
disseminated, shareholders can undertake two major actions to influence
the amount of compensation paid to executives: place proposals directly
on proxy statements pursuant to Rule 14a-8 of the Exchange Act 50
and/or launch “vote no” or “withhold the vote” campaigns.
1. Shareholder Proposals
The form and substance of shareholder proposals changed over
time. While precatory resolutions on executive compensation were
historically supported by social or labor activists and disfavored by
institutional investors, the data from proxy resolutions show that in
recent years, executive pay has become increasingly important to all
shareholders. 51 In 2004, there were twenty-three shareholder proposals
regarding pay for performance and in 2007 there were over sixty. 52 The
percentage of shareholders who voted for these proposals increased from
19.2% to 35.1% during this period. 53 Shareholders regarded executive
pay as the most important issue during the 2006 proxy season, 54 and a

48. Id. at 64-66. Outrage costs refer to negative reactions by outsiders regarding
high levels of executive compensation. Id. at 65.
49. See Adopting Release, supra note 3, at 53,159 (stating that the new rules will
provide investors with a more complete picture of the compensation earned by a
company’s executives).
50. 17 C.F.R. § 240.14a-8 (2007).
51. See BEBCHUK & FRIED, supra note 18, at 52. Precatory resolutions are not
binding on the board even though they are supported by a majority of shareholders. Id.
52. See 2006 Postseason Report: Spotlight on Executive Pay and Board
Accountability, 2006 Institutional Shareholder Services 3 [hereinafter Postseason
Report]; Posting of L. Reed Walton to Risk & Governance Blog,
http://blog.riskmetrics.com/2007/07/preliminary_postseason_reports.html (July 13,
2007) [hereinafter Walton Blog].
53. See Postseason Report, supra note 52, at 4; Walton Blog, supra note 52.
54. See Postseason Report, supra note 52, at 2.
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preliminary review of the 2007 proxy season shows this trend is
continuing. 55
Two of the most popular shareholder proposals during the 2006 and
2007 proxy seasons were “pay for performance” and “say on pay”
resolutions. 56 Pay for performance resolutions base a CEO’s pay
relative to his or her company’s total shareholder return. 57 Say on pay
proposals give shareholders a non-binding advisory vote on executive
compensation packages and first appeared on shareholders’ ballots in
2006; by 2007 there were more than forty such proposals, and the
percentage of shareholders who voted for these proposals increased from
40% to 42.4% during this time period. 58
Observing the popularity of say on pay resolutions, the U.S. House
of Representatives passed a “say on pay bill” on April 20, 2007. 59 This
bill requires corporations to give shareholders the right to vote on
executive pay packages without having to use shareholder proposals.60
Boards can disregard the results of the votes, however, because they are
still non-binding. 61 It is worth mentioning that this bill tracks similar
legislation in Britain and Australia, which mandates voting on say on
pay and has fostered a cooperative dialogue among shareholders and
boards about compensation. 62
2. Vote No Campaigns
Shareholders can show their staunch disapproval of executive
compensation packages by engaging in “vote no” or “withhold the vote”
campaigns. While shareholders cannot vote against a director who is
running unopposed, they can withhold their vote from one or more

55.
56.
57.
58.
59.

See Walton Blog, supra note 52.
See Postseason Report, supra note 52, at 2; Walton Blog, supra note 52.
See Postseason Report, supra note 52, at 15.
See Walton Blog, supra note 52.
See House Votes to Give Investors Say on Executive Pay, N.Y. TIMES, Apr. 21,
2007, at C4. The bill was drafted by Representative Barney Frank, a Democrat from
Massachusetts and the chairman of the Financial Services Committee. It passed by a
269-134 vote. Id.
60. Id.
61. Id.
62. See Gretchen Morgenson, Roadblocks To Greater Say on Pay, N.Y. TIMES, Jan.
21, 2007, § 3, at 1.
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directors up for election. 63 Although directors only need a plurality of
votes to get elected, a substantial “withheld vote” in a director election
demonstrates sharp shareholder criticism of executive pay packages. 64
In 2006, investors withheld support for compensation committee
members at many large companies, including Pfizer. 65 While the AFLCIO and the Connecticut Retirement Plans and Trust Funds chastised the
$83 million retirement package for CEO Henry McKinnell, an investor
group organized a “vote no” campaign against two Pfizer compensation
committee board members. 66 Both members received a 21% withhold
vote. 67 Similarly, ten of eleven directors at Home Depot received
withhold votes ranging from 30% to 36% in 2006. 68 Home Depot
investors were enraged that the company’s CEO had earned $200
million in compensation between 2001 and 2005 while the company’s
stock price dropped 13%. 69 The staggering number of shareholder
protests through withhold votes should cause boards to reevaluate the
amount of, and manner in which, executives receive compensation.
B. Lack of Social Accountability
When shareholders, business media, social groups and professional
groups know the amount of compensation paid to executives, the
disapproval by these groups can result in “outrage costs.” 70 There are
three main ways in which this public outcry might influence both the
levels of executive compensation and the policies by which executive
compensation is determined: through the market for corporate control,
the labor market, and the social network. 71

63. Diane Del Guercio, Laura Wallis & Tracie Woidtke, Do Boards Pay Attention
when Institutional Investors ‘Just Vote No’? CEO and Director Turnover Associated
with Shareholder Activism 3 (U. of Tenn. Corp. Gov. Ctr., Working Paper, 2006),
available at http://www.corpgovcenter.org/Research2006/DoBGueWalWoi2006.pdf.
64. Id.
65. See Postseason Report, supra note 52, at 5. Other companies include:
UnitedHealth, Occidental Petroleum, Exxon Mobil, Clear Channel Communications,
CA, and Home Depot. Id. at 5-6.
66. Id.
67. Id.
68. Id. at 6.
69. Id.
70. See BEBCHUK & FRIED, supra note 18, at 64-66.
71. Id.
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In the market for corporate control, investors could view excessive
compensation as a sign of director and manager indifference to
shareholder interests. 72 As a result, shareholders will seek to divert
power away from the board when presented with the opportunity to do
so. 73 For example, in a proxy fight or hostile takeover, these investors
would probably not support the incumbents. 74
The sanctioning of excessive executive compensation has the
potential to give directors and managers negative reputations.75 This
might affect future career prospects and lead to disapproval by social
and professional groups. 76 Consequently, this public embarrassment and
criticism can affect both the levels of executive pay and the means by
which it is awarded. 77
While outrage costs are a powerful constraint on executive pay,
they deliver little influence on the levels of compensation unless all
observers are familiar with the amount of, and the way that, executive
compensation is awarded. 78 The new executive compensation disclosure
rules now require disclosure of most of this information.
III. OVERVIEW OF THE NEW EXECUTIVE COMPENSATION
DISCLOSURE RULES
After proposing amendments to the executive compensation
disclosure rules 79 and receiving 28,828 comments in response, 80 the
SEC adopted amendments to the disclosure requirements for executive
compensation and other corporate governance matters. 81 The new rules

72.
73.
74.
75.
76.
77.
78.
79.

Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Executive Compensation and Related Party Disclosure, Securities Act Release
No. 8655, Exchange Act Release No. 3185, Investment Company Act Release No.
27,218, 71 Fed. Reg. 6542 (proposed Feb. 8, 2006), available at http://www.sec.gov/rul
es/proposed/33-8655fr.pdf [hereinafter Proposing Release].
80. Comments on Proposed Rule: Executive Compensation and Related Party
Disclosure, http://www.sec.gov/rules/proposed/s70306.shtml.
81. See Adopting Release, supra note 3, at 53,158. In addition to amending the
rules for executive compensation and certain corporate governance matters, the SEC
also amended the requirements for disclosure of related party transactions and board
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were designed to provide investors with a clearer and more complete
picture of executive compensation. 82 The rules require increased
discussion of a company’s use of compensation consultants. 83
Moreover, the compensation committee of the board of directors must
furnish a report stating that it reviewed and discussed the Compensation
Discussion and Analysis section (“CD&A”) with management. 84 The
CD&A is a narrative description of a company’s data regarding
compensation policies and procedures reflected in the tables. 85 The SEC
underscores that the Summary Compensation Table, however, remains
the principal disclosure vehicle for executive compensation. 86
A. Corporate Governance Disclosures
The SEC currently mandates more thorough disclosure regarding
compensation consultants than it had in previous years.87 This
information is not required in the CD&A, but instead must be disclosed
in the corporate governance section, which focuses on the resources
utilized by the compensation committee in setting the amount of
executive pay. 88 Each company must disclose the following: state any
role of compensation consultants in determining the amount of
compensation; identify such consultants; state whether such consultants
are engaged directly by the compensation committee; describe the nature
and scope of their assignment; and list the material elements of the
instructions or directions given to the consultants with respect to the
performance of their duties under the engagement. 89 Despite the breadth
of this disclosure, it is still incomplete—the company is not required to
disclose whether the compensation consultant performs other consulting
services for management. 90
compensation. Id. However, this article is solely focused on the amendments to the
executive compensation rules and certain corporate governance matters.
82. Id.
83. Id. at 53,205.
84. Id. at 53,168.
85. Id. at 53,160.
86. Id. at 53,169. This table shows compensation with respect to the last three
fiscal years and discloses a single figure for total compensation. Id.
87. Id. at 53,205.
88. Id.
89. 17 C.F.R. § 229.407(e)(3)(iii) (2007).
90. See Letter from James F. Reda, Managing Dir., James F. Reda & Assocs., LLC,
to Nancy M. Morris, Sec’y, SEC 4 (Apr. 6, 2006), available at
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B. Compensation Committee Report
Under the new rules, a company’s compensation committee must
furnish a Compensation Committee Report. 91 This report is similar to
the Audit Committee Report currently required in proxy statements. 92
In this section, the compensation committee needs to state that it
discussed the CD&A with management, and that based on this review
and discussion, it recommended to the board of directors the inclusion of
the CD&A in the proxy statement. 93 Like the Audit Committee Report,
the name of each member of the compensation committee has to appear
below the disclosure. 94 Yet, unlike the Audit Committee Report, which
has a separate section describing whether auditors are independent of
management, 95 the Compensation Committee Report contains no
separate section requiring disclosure of whether compensation
consultants are independent of management. 96 Because compensation
consultants might have conflicts of interest, the absence of such
disclosure makes the new rules incomplete. 97
C. Compensation Discussion and Analysis
The CD&A is a narrative overview which provides information
about the company’s compensation objectives, policies, procedures, and
processes. 98 This section is designed to put into narrative context the
disclosure provided elsewhere in the filing. 99 The CD&A is considered
part of the proxy statement and any other filing that includes it. 100 The
SEC deems the CD&A “soliciting material” that must be filed with the

http://www.sec.gov/rules/proposed/s70306/jfreda3948.pdf [hereinafter Reda Comment
Letter].
91. See Adopting Release, supra note 3, at 53,168.
92. Id. at 53,168.
93. Id.
94. Id.
95. 17 C.F.R. § 240.14a-101(9)(e)(1) (2007).
96. See Reda Comment Letter, supra note 90, at 3-4.
97. Id. at 4-5.
98. See Adopting Release, supra note 3, at 53,164.
99. Id.
100. Id. at 53,167.
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Commission and therefore is subject to Regulation 14A or 14C and the
liabilities of section 18 of the Exchange Act. 101
The CD&A ought to explain the following: the objectives of the
compensation program; what the compensation program is designed to
reward; each element of compensation; why the company chooses to pay
each element; how the company determines the amount for each
element; and how each element fits into the company’s overall
compensation objectives. 102 To offer guidance to companies, the SEC
lists several examples of the topics that might need to be disclosed in
this section. 103 Since the rule requires disclosure of all material
101.
102.
103.

Id.
Id. at 53,164.
Id. at 53,165. Examples of such information include: (i) The policies for
allocating between long-term and currently paid out compensation; (ii) The policies for
allocating between cash and non-cash compensation, and among different forms of noncash compensation; (iii) For long-term compensation, the basis for allocating
compensation to each different form of award (such as relationship of the award to the
achievement of the registrant’s long-term goals, management’s exposure to downside
equity performance risk, correlation between cost to registrant and expected benefits to
the registrant); (iv) How the determination is made as to when awards are granted,
including awards of equity-based compensation such as options; (v) What specific items
of corporate performance are taken into account in setting compensation policies and
making compensation decisions; (vi) How specific forms of compensation are
structured and implemented to reflect these items of the registrant’s performance,
including whether discretion can be or has been exercised (either to award
compensation absent attainment of the relevant performance goal(s) or to reduce or
increase the size of any award or payout), identifying any particular exercise of
discretion, and stating whether it applied to one or more specified named executive
officers or to all compensation subject to the relevant performance goal(s); (vii) How
specific forms of compensation are structured and implemented to reflect the named
executive officer’s individual performance and/or individual contribution to these items
of the registrant’s performance, describing the elements of individual performance
and/or contribution that are taken into account; (viii) Registrant policies and decisions
regarding the adjustment or recovery of awards or payments if the relevant registrant
performance measures upon which they are based are restated or otherwise adjusted in a
manner that would reduce the size of an award or payment; (ix) The factors considered
in decisions to increase or decrease compensation materially; (x) How compensation or
amounts realizable from prior compensation are considered in setting other elements of
compensation (e.g., how gains from prior option or stock awards are considered in
setting retirement benefits); (xi) With respect to any contract, agreement, plan or
arrangement, whether written or unwritten, that provides for payment(s) at, following,
or in connection with any termination or change-in-control, the basis for selecting
particular events as triggering payment (e.g., the rationale for providing a single trigger
for payment in the event of a change-in-control); (xii) The impact of the accounting and
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information, however, a company can neither rely solely on disclosing
information that relates to these examples nor use mere boilerplate
disclosure. 104 A company must disclose all information that is material
to its compensation objectives and policies, unless a specific exemption
applies, such as the exemption for target performance levels. 105 This
safe harbor for performance targets makes the new disclosure rules
incomplete. 106
D. Summary Compensation Table
The purpose of the Summary Compensation Table is to provide
investors with a simplified and more comprehendible picture of total
compensation and the various elements that comprise it. 107 This table is
the primary disclosure vehicle for executive pay and was designed to
capture all forms of executive compensation. 108
The Summary
Compensation Table requires that a company disclose all executive
compensation with respect to the last three fiscal years. 109 The portion
of the Summary Compensation Table requiring monetary disclosure is
reproduced below: 110
Salary

Bonus

Stock

Option

Non-equity

Change In Pension

All Other

Total

(c)

(d)

Awards

Awards

Incentive Plan

Value and Non-

Compen-

Compen-

(e)

(f)

Compensation

qualified Deferred

sation

sation

(g)

Compensation

(i)

(j)

Earnings (h)

tax treatments of the particular form of compensation; (xiii) The registrant’s equity or
other security ownership requirements or guidelines (specifying applicable amounts and
forms of ownership), and any registrant policies regarding hedging the economic risk of
such ownership; (xiv) Whether the registrant engaged in any benchmarking of total
compensation, or any material element of compensation, identifying the benchmark
and, if applicable, its components (including component companies); and (xv) The role
of executive officers in determining executive compensation. Id.
104. See Adopting Release, supra note 3, at 53,164.
105. Id. at 53,166; see infra Part IV.B.
106. See Letter from Richard L. Trumka, Sec’y-Treasurer, AFL-CIO, to Nancy M.
Morris, Sec’y, SEC 2 (Apr. 5, 2006), available at http://www.sec.gov/rules/propo
sed/s70306/aflcio040506.pdf [hereinafter Trumka Comment Letter].
107. See Adopting Release, supra note 3, at 53,169.
108. Id. at 53,169.
109. Id.
110. Id. at 53,170.
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The total compensation column (column (j)) is an innovative and
crucial part of the new rules. 111 Prior to the amendments, securities
analysts and investors were unable to determine an accurate figure for
total compensation. 112 Moreover, they could not determine an amount
of total compensation that was comparable across years for the same
company or for the same year across different companies. 113 The new
total compensation column tries to solve these problems by attempting
to capture all of the compensation earned by executive officers. 114 It
does so by aggregating in column (j) the total dollar value that is
disclosed in columns (c) through (i). 115 In light of the way in which
nonqualified deferred compensation earnings column (h) and perquisites
column (i) are disclosed, however, the total compensation column will
be understated. 116
IV. PROBLEMS WITH THE NEW EXECUTIVE COMPENSATION
DISCLOSURE RULES
The amended executive compensation disclosure rules do not result
in complete disclosure because (1) information regarding the conflicts of
interest of compensation consultants is lacking; (2) disclosure regarding
performance target levels is lacking; (3) only above-market interest rate
earnings on deferred compensation need be disclosed; and (4) only
disclosure of perquisites exceeding $10,000 is required. 117
A. Compensation Consultants’ Conflicts of Interest
The current relationship between compensation consultants and the
compensation committee is similar to the relationship between auditors
and the audit committee prior to the enactment of the Sarbanes-Oxley
Act. 118 Before Sarbanes-Oxley, the auditing firms of the late 1990s
generated large percentages of their revenue by providing non-audit

111.
112.
113.
114.
115.
116.
117.
118.

Id.
Adopting Release, supra note 3, at 53,170.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 53,174-76.
See infra Part IV.A-D.
See Reda Comment Letter, supra note 90, at 5.

76

FORDHAM JOURNAL OF
CORPORATE & FINANCIAL LAW

Vol. XIII

consulting services to companies. 119 As a result, auditors had an
incentive to approve misleading accounting figures so that they could
preserve and obtain more lucrative non-audit consulting contracts from
management. 120 To prevent this conflict of interest the Sarbanes-Oxley
Act limited the types of non-audit services that an accounting firm can
provide to a company for which it performs an audit. 121 In fact, the Act
eliminated the economic incentives for the auditors to conform to
management’s personal objectives during the audit. 122 However, this
economic incentive was not eliminated for compensation consultants
who perform services for both the compensation committee and
management. 123
Like the auditing firms of the late 1990s, compensation consultants
stand to profit more from the work performed for management than
from the services provided to the compensation committee. 124 This
incentive is present because most human resources consulting firms are
diversified. 125 In fact, out of the largest consulting firms in the United
States, just one company provides only compensation consulting
services. 126 Moreover, compensation consulting makes up a very small
percentage of revenue for most diversified consulting firms. 127 For
example, at a typical diversified consulting firm, compensation
consulting revenue will be between 0.5% and 2% of total firm
revenue. 128 Therefore, all other revenues come from non-executive
compensation-related consulting services. 129
As a result, the diversified consulting firm’s impartiality is
compromised when it provides executive compensation advice to the
board and is retained by management for other services. 130 Consultants
presumably support management’s compensation decisions in order to
119.
120.
121.
122.
123.
124.
125.
126.
127.
128.
129.
130.

Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 1.
Id. at 5.
Id. at 6.
Id. at 5.
Id. at 7.
Id.
Id.
Letter from Peter C. Clapman, CEO, Governance for Owners USA Inc., to
Nancy M. Morris, Sec’y, SEC 4 (Apr. 7, 2006), available at
http://www.sec.gov/rules/proposed/s70306/pcclapman6514.pdf
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preserve and obtain lucrative consulting contracts for matters other than
executive compensation consulting. 131 Thus, they are less likely to be
independent in their advice to the compensation committee because they
are under pressure to produce compensation packages that satisfy
management. 132
B. Target Performance Levels
Under the new rules, the SEC does not require companies to
disclose performance target levels in the CD&A if such disclosure
would result in competitive harm to the company. 133 A performance
target level is a quantitative or qualitative performance-related standard
considered by the compensation committee of the board of directors that
an executive must meet to obtain a certain level of compensation.134
Pursuant to the amendments, companies are exempt from disclosing
performance targets involving confidential trade secrets or confidential
commercial or financial information if the disclosure would result in
competitive harm. 135
In order to satisfy this exemption, the company must demonstrate to
the SEC that it has met the same standard for confidential treatment that
is used when the Commission decides whether to grant a confidential
treatment request. 136 In effect, the rule maintains a safe harbor under
which companies may exclude performance targets if the SEC finds that
such disclosure would be competitively harmful to the company. 137
131. See Reda Comment Letter, supra note 90, at 7.
132. Id.
133. See Adopting Release, supra note 3, at 53,166.
134. Id.
135. Id.
136. Id. at 53,166-67.
While the instruction adopted . . . does not require a company to seek confidential
treatment under the procedures in Securities Act Rule 406 and Exchange Act Rule
24b–2 with regard to the exclusion of the information from the disclosure provided in
response to this item, the standards specified in Securities Act Rule 406, Exchange
Act Rule 24b-2, Exemption 4 of the Freedom of Information Act and Rule 80(b)(4)
promulgated under the Freedom of Information Act still apply and are subject to
review and comment by the staff of the Commission.

Id. at 53,167 n.94.
137. Letter from Ann Yerger, Executive Dir., Council of Institutional Investors, to
Nancy M. Morris, Sec’y, SEC 2 (Mar. 29, 2006), available at
http://www.sec.gov/rules/proposed/s70306/s70306-74.pdf
[hereinafter
Yerger
Comment Letter].
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Exempting performance targets from the CD&A impairs the quality of
information disclosed, however, because it makes the link between
executive pay and company performance difficult to assess. 138
Pay for performance is probably the most important issue for
shareholders regarding executive compensation. 139 Yet, under the new
rules, shareholders will not know the performance target levels that
executives must meet to obtain a specified level of compensation.140
Consequently, they cannot accurately determine whether executives are
being paid for meeting these targets. 141 Because companies do not have
to disclose the levels of compensation that are tied to the targets, nor
disclose whether such targets were met, the owners of the firm will not
be informed as to how and why executives are compensated. 142
Moreover, shareholders can best judge the effectiveness of their
board if they have access to information about performance targets.143
Therefore, disclosure would help make compensation committees more
accountable should they decide to provide bonuses or incentive pay even
when performance targets are not met. 144
The exemption of
performance targets is also unwarranted because shareholders, as the
owners of the company, are entitled to know the levels of performance
that must be achieved to earn the performance awards. 145 By exempting
companies from making this type of disclosure, the Commission
perpetuates shareholder ignorance about significant portions of a firm’s
compensation policies. 146 This exception undermines the purpose of the
new rules because it leaves out a vital element of the company’s
compensation philosophy. 147

138.
139.
140.

Id.
Trumka Comment Letter, supra note 106.
See Letter from the Honorable Barney Frank, Member, House Comm. on Fin.
Servs., to Christopher Cox, Chairman, SEC 2 (Apr. 10, 2006), available at
http://www.sec.gov/rules/proposed/s70306/bfrank041006.pdf
[hereinafter
Frank
Comment Letter].
141. Id.
142. Id.
143. Id.
144. Id.
145. See Trumka Comment Letter, supra note 106.
146. See generally Trumka Comment Letter, supra note 106.
147. Id.
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C. Summary Compensation Table
Under the new rules, the figure for total compensation will be
understated for two reasons. The first reason is that earnings on deferred
compensation only have to be disclosed at above-market interest rates.148
The other reason is that perquisites only have to be disclosed to the
extent that they exceed $10,000. 149 Because both of these figures are
part of the total compensation column, 150 the amount of total
compensation will be understated. 151 In the Summary Compensation
Table, nonqualified earnings on deferred compensation are disclosed in
column (h), perquisites in column (i), and total compensation in column
(j). 152 To highlight these portions of the Summary Compensation Table,
the table is reproduced below: 153
Salary

Bonus

Stock

Option

Non-equity

Change In Pension

All

Total

(c)

(d)

Awards

Awards

Incentive

Value and Non-

Other

Compen-

(e)

(f)

Plan

qualified Deferred

Compen-

sation

Compen-

Compensation

sation

(j)

sation

Earnings

(i)

(g)

(h)

1. Nonqualified Deferred Compensation Earnings
Under the new rules, the disclosure of deferred compensation
earnings is limited to the amount earned at above-market interest
rates. 154 The term “above-market interest” refers to interest earned in
excess of 120% of the applicable federal long-term rate. 155 As of
September 2007, this above-market interest would include interest
earned at a rate that exceeds 6.13%. 156 This means that a company does

148.
149.
150.
151.
152.
153.
154.
155.
156.

See Adopting Release, supra note 3, at 53,174.
Id. at 53,176.
Id. at 53,170.
Id. at 53,176.
Id. at 53,170.
Id.
Id. at 53,174.
Id.
Rev. Rul. 2007-57, 2007-36 I.R.B. 532, available at http://www.irs.gov/pub/
irs-irbs/irb07-36.pdf (last visited Sept. 9, 2007).
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not have to disclose earnings on deferred compensation that accrue at an
interest rate below 6.13%. 157
An analysis of the earnings on deferred compensation at Analog
Devices, Inc. (“Analog”) provides an example of how disclosing
earnings at above-market interest rates results in incomplete disclosure.
At Analog, the company’s CEO withdrew a previously undisclosed
$144.7 million from his deferred compensation account. 158 Under the
rules in effect when this 2006 proxy statement was filed, Analog was not
obligated to disclose this amount to investors. 159 Pursuant to the new
rules, companies must disclose the amount of deferred compensation. 160
Yet, the rules only require disclosure of a portion of the interest earned
on executives’ deferred compensation accounts. 161 For example, had the
new rules been in effect when Analog’s CEO earned $8.7 million in
interest on the money in his deferred compensation account in 2005, 162
Analog would have been required to disclose only $1.2 million of this
interest. 163 As a result, total compensation would have been understated
by $7.5 million. 164
2. Perquisites
Perquisites given to executives are disclosed in the All Other
Compensation Column of the Summary Compensation Table (column
(i)), and the dollar figure disclosed for these earnings is used to calculate
the total amount of compensation. 165 Companies must disclose perks

157.
158.

See Adopting Release, supra note 3, at 53,174.
See Gretchen Morgenson, A ‘Holy Cow’ Moment in Payland, N.Y. TIMES, Feb.
19, 2006, § 3, at 1; Analog Devices, Inc., Definitive Proxy Statement (Form 14A), at 28
(Feb. 8, 2006) [hereinafter Analog Proxy].
159. Morgenson, supra note 158.
160. Adopting Release, supra note 3, at 53,170.
161. Id. at 53,174.
162. See Analog Proxy, supra note 158, at 19.
163. Id. at 19 n.3. “SEC regulations consider the ‘market rate’ to be 120% of the
applicable federal long-term rate, or AFR. Earnings credited to participants electing the
fixed-rate investment option for fiscal year 2005 were calculated using an average
interest rate of 6.48% and 120% of the average AFR was 5.57%.” Id. With earnings of
$8,743,912 at 6.48%, the total earnings on deferred compensation are $134,936,914,
and the earnings on this total at 5.57% are $7,515,986. The company is only obligated
to disclose above-market earnings of $1,227,926.
164. See supra note 163 and accompanying text.
165. See Adopting Release, supra note 3, at 53,176.
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unless the amount of such compensation is less than $10,000. 166
Although the amendments to the rules for disclosing perquisites are an
improvement compared to the old regime, the exemption causes the total
compensation figure to be understated. 167
There are two reasons why all perquisites should be disclosed. 168
The first reason is that any substantial threshold, especially one as large
as $10,000, provides a loophole for companies. 169 Firms can simply
disaggregate perquisite compensation to qualify for the exemption by
breaking the perks down into increments that are less than $10,000.170
For example, a firm could allocate $9,000 for football tickets, $9,000 for
theatre tickets, and $9,000 for basketball tickets, and disclose none of
this information in the Summary Compensation Table. 171 Another
permutation of this abuse could be as follows: a company could break
down a car allowance into a car leasing allowance, a gas allowance, a
car insurance allowance, and a travel allowance while not disclosing the
total car allowance. 172 It is easy to imagine that under the new rules a
company could have $1,000,000 of perquisites broken down into 110
separate items each worth roughly $9000, resulting in hundreds of
thousands of dollars worth of perks remaining undisclosed. 173
The second reason all perquisites should be disclosed is that certain
perks might be a waste of corporate assets even absent a major impact
on the total compensation column. 174 For example, a company could
provide lavish office extras such as daily flowers and gilded umbrella
166.
167.

Id.
See id. (noting that the earlier rule permitted the omission of perquisites if the
aggregate amount of such compensation was the lesser of either $50,000 or 10% of the
total annual salary and bonus).
168. Letter from C. William Jones, President and Executive Dir., Ass’n of BellTel
Retirees, to Nancy M. Morris, Sec’y, SEC 4 (Apr. 10, 2006), available at
http://www.sec.gov/rules/proposed/s70306/cjones9947.pdf [hereinafter Jones Comment
Letter].
169. Id.
170. Letter from Kurt Schacht, CFA, Managing Dir., CFA Ctr. for Fin. Mkt.
Integrity & James C. Allen, CFA, Senior Policy Analyst, CFA Ctr. for Fin. Mkt.
Integrity, to Nancy M. Morris, Sec’y, SEC 8 (Apr. 13, 2006), available at
http://www.sec.gov/rules/proposed/s70306/jcallen041306.pdf.
171. See Letter from Paul Hodgson, Senior Research Assoc., The Corporate Library,
to Nancy M. Morris, Sec’y, SEC 2 (Mar. 10, 2006), available at http://www.sec.gov/ru
les/proposed/s70306/phodgson032706.pdf [hereinafter Hodgson Comment Letter].
172. Id. at 2.
173. Id.
174. Jones Comment Letter, supra note 171.
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stands. 175 Regardless of the perquisite’s significance on the total
compensation column, the very fact of such a perk could signal the
existence of other problems with the company’s executive compensation
policies. 176
V. PROPOSED SOLUTIONS TO THE PROBLEMS WITH THE NEW
DISCLOSURE RULES
The proposed solutions to the problems with the amended executive
compensation disclosure rules are specifically designed to address the
four problems with the rules. First, the Commission should require
disclosure of all work performed by compensation consultants by
requiring companies to disclose all fees received by these consultants. 177
Second, the SEC must insist upon disclosure of target performance
levels after the conclusion of the performance period. 178 Third, the
Commission needs to mandate disclosure of all earnings on deferred
compensation and require disclosure of all perquisites. 179
A. Disclosure of All Work Performed by Compensation Consultants
The Commission should require companies to disclose all of the
work performed by compensation consultants, list the fees received for
the work that is done, and state the nature of the work that is
performed. 180 To accomplish this goal, the SEC ought to amend section
407(e) of Regulation S-K, and in so doing ask companies to provide a
tabular disclosure of these fees. 181 The table should include the type of
work performed by the compensation consultant and the fees received
175.
176.

Id.
See Letter from Martha L. Carter, Senior Vice President and Managing Dir. of
Corporate Governance, Institutional S’holder Servs., to Nancy M. Morris, Sec’y, SEC 3
(Mar. 28, 2006), available at http://www.sec.gov/rules/proposed/s70306/mcarter9965.
pdf.
177. See infra Part V.A.
178. See infra Part V.B.
179. See infra Part V.C.
180. Letter from Brian T. Foley, Managing Dir., Brian Foley & Co., Inc., to Nancy
M. Morris, Sec’y, SEC 2-3 (Apr. 10, 2006), available at http://www.sec.gov/rules/pro
posed/s70306/btfoley4083.pdf.
181. See Reda Comment Letter, supra note 90, at 7 (suggesting similar disclosure
but suggesting that such disclosure should be included in the CD&A rather than as an
amendment to section 407(e)).
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by the consultant for this work. 182 To ensure a more comprehensive and
textured response, however, the SEC cannot abandon narrative
disclosure, and can ask companies to include such a description of the
specific nature of the work performed in the footnotes to this table. 183
This disclosure is appropriate because of the similarity between the
current relationship among compensation consultants, management, and
the compensation committee, and the relationship among auditors,
management, and the audit committee prior to Sarbanes-Oxley. 184 In
fact, this recommended disclosure is similar to the disclosure required in
the Audit Committee Report. 185 Such disclosure is crucial to assure that
auditors are truly independent of management. 186 Thus, by requiring a
table for compensation consultants similar to the one included in the
Audit Committee Report for auditors, investors will be better able to see
whether compensation consultants are independent of management, 187
thereby compelling the compensation committee to ensure that
compensation consulting advice comes without coercive strings
attached. 188
To assure independence, the tabular disclosure required by the
suggested amendments to section 407(e) of Regulation S-K should result
in the following table: 189
EXECUTIVE COMPENSATION CONSULTING FEES AND ALL OTHER FEES
2007

2006

$XXX

$XXX

All Other Fees (b)

$XXX

$XXX

Total Fees (c)

$XXX

$XXX

Executive Compensation
Consulting Fees (a)

In this table, companies would have to disclose the following
information: under the caption Executive Compensation Consulting
Fees, the aggregate fees billed for each of the last two fiscal years for
182.
183.
184.
185.
186.
187.
188.
189.

Id.
Id. at 3.
Id. at 5.
Id. at 7.
Id. at 5.
Id. at 7.
Id. at 7-8.
Id. This table is similar, but not identical, to the table provided in the Reda
Comment Letter.
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executive compensation consulting services rendered by the principal
compensation consultant (row (a)); for fees disclosed under this
category, the company would have to describe the nature of the services
comprising the fees; under the caption All Other Fees, the aggregate fees
billed in each of the last two fiscal years for products and services
provided by the principal compensation consultant, other than the
services reported in (row (a)); for fees disclosed under this category, the
company would have to describe the nature of the services comprising
the fees; and under the caption total fees, the sum of the amounts
reported in rows (a) and (b).
B. Disclosure of Target Performance Levels after the Conclusion
of the Performance Period
The SEC needs to mandate the disclosure of target performance
levels after the conclusion of the performance period 190 by amending
Instruction 4 to Item 402(b) of Regulation S-K to require disclosure after
the performance related to the award is measured. 191 This increased
disclosure would result in investors being better able to assess the link
between executive pay and company performance. 192 While the
disclosure of performance targets can result in competitive harm, the
potential for this harm is mitigated if disclosure is required after the
performance related to the award is measured. 193 Because competitors
would also be required to publish information about performance
targets, the competitive costs to the companies should equalize once all
the information is disclosed. 194 In short, this disclosure will not result in
competitive harm because companies and compensation consultants
already have access to this information. 195
Moreover, because
performance targets are generally based upon public information such as
the company stock price or disclosed financial statements, requiring
disclosure of targets will not place an undue burden on companies. 196
Thus, the Commission should require companies to disclose this
information to give investors a better understanding of a company’s
190.
191.
192.
193.
194.
195.
196.

See Yerger Comment Letter, supra note 137.
Id. at 3.
See Frank Comment Letter, supra note 140.
See Adopting Release, supra note 3, at 53,166.
See Frank Comment Letter, supra note 140.
Id.
See Trumka Comment Letter, supra note 106.
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compensation policies, philosophies, and procedures. 197 Requiring
disclosure after the conclusion of the performance period is appropriate
because it addresses companies’ competitive concerns while providing
shareholders with important information about executive compensation
practices. 198
To strike the appropriate balance between the competitive concerns
of companies and shareholders’ access to information, the SEC should
require companies to disclose the performance measure, the
performance target, the actual performance, whether or not the target
was achieved, and the amount earned from the performance. Amending
Instruction 4 to Item 402(b) achieves the requisite balance among the
interests of investors, the company, and the public. 199
The
corresponding table should appear as follows:
Performance

Performance

Actual

Measure

Target

Performance

Achievement

Amount Earned

C. Disclosure of All Earnings on Deferred Compensation
and All Perquisites
In its proposing release, the Commission recommended disclosure
of all earnings on deferred compensation. 200 The SEC should have
implemented the rules as proposed. 201 It should remedy this decision by
amending Item 402(c)(2)(viii)(B) to require disclosure of all earnings on
deferred compensation. In addition, this Item should also require
separate footnote identification if such earnings exceed $10,000. 202 The
Commission should also adopt Proposed Instruction 5 to Item
402(c)(2)(ix), which permits a company to identify by footnote the
portion of any earnings that it considered to be paid at an above-market

197.
198.
199.
200.
201.

See Yerger Comment Letter, supra note 137, app. at 2.
See Frank Comment Letter, supra note 140.
Yerger Comment Letter, supra note 137, app. at 3.
Proposing Release, supra note 79, at 6552.
“Such compensation must include, but is not limited to . . . all earnings on
compensation that is deferred on a basis that is not tax-qualified, including such
earnings on non-qualified defined contribution plans.” Id. at 6612.
202. Id. at 6552.
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interest rate. 203 The current rule, by enabling companies to skirt
disclosure of all earnings on deferred compensation, allows firms to
avoid disclosure of substantial executive pay. 204 This exemption also
causes the total compensation figure to be understated. Consequently,
the Commission should adopt the recommended amendment because it
strikes the appropriate equilibrium between disclosing earnings that a
company believes to be above-market and capturing all of the
compensation paid to executives.
In addition to requiring disclosure of all earnings on deferred
compensation, the SEC should require disclosure of all perquisites. To
accomplish this goal, the Commission needs to amend Item
402(c)(2)(ix)(A) to eliminate the $10,000 threshold for the disclosure of
perks. Although the SEC acknowledges that the exclusion of perquisites
results in an understated figure for total compensation, it justifies the
$10,000 threshold because of the potential burden on companies to track
every benefit, no matter how small. 205 Yet, companies’ accounting
departments already track this expense; therefore, most firms have this
information readily available. 206 Moreover, shareholders are entitled to
know both the amount and types of perquisites to assess whether the
board is wasting corporate assets. 207 Consequently, the SEC ought to
adopt the recommended amendment because it provides necessary
information to shareholders and results in a more accurate figure for
total compensation.
VI. CONCLUSION
Although the amendments to the executive compensation disclosure
rules are an improvement over the previous regime, the new rules do not
result in complete disclosure. Therefore, the Commission should require
disclosure of all work performed by compensation consultants, all
performance targets after the conclusion of the performance period, all
earnings on deferred compensation, and all perquisites. While the SEC
should be commended for the new rules, an exhaustive review of the

203.
204.
205.
206.
207.

Id.
See BEBCHUK & FRIED, supra note 18, at 314-15.
See Adopting Release, supra note 3, at 53,176.
See Hodgson Comment Letter, supra note 174.
See Jones Comment Letter, supra note 171.
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2007 proxy season is likely to reveal some of the rules’ deficiencies.
This article addressed some of these shortcomings, but further inquiry
into the sufficiency of the new rules is warranted.

